<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Starlink on BRYSGO</title><link>https://www.brysgo.com/tags/starlink/</link><description>Recent content in Starlink on BRYSGO</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 01:41:50 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.brysgo.com/tags/starlink/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Connectivity Infrastructure Is Not a Neutral Service</title><link>https://www.brysgo.com/post/2026-06-11-connectivity-infrastructure-is-not-a-neutral-service/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 01:41:50 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.brysgo.com/post/2026-06-11-connectivity-infrastructure-is-not-a-neutral-service/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;When SpaceX deactivated Russian military terminals in February 2026, a firmware whitelist did what sanctions committees and foreign policy briefings could not — and no elected body authorized it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;rsquo;s worth sitting with for a moment. A private company, operating satellites in low Earth orbit, made a real-time decision that degraded the command-and-control capability of a nation-state&amp;rsquo;s military by roughly 90%. Russian units that had been relying on smuggled Starlink terminals — acquired through Central Asian black markets and deployed along the Donetsk frontline — suddenly went dark. They reverted to VHF radios and fiber-optic improvisation. The whitelist was technically elegant, operationally decisive, and politically unaccountable in any meaningful democratic sense.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>